strace of io_uring events?
sgarzare at redhat.com
Fri Jul 17 08:01:57 UTC 2020
On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 08:12:35AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 03:14:04PM +0200, Stefano Garzarella wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 04:07:00PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > [...]
> > > Speaking to Stefano's proposal:
> > >
> > > - There appear to be three classes of desired restrictions:
> > > - opcodes for io_uring_register() (which can be enforced entirely with
> > > seccomp right now).
> > > - opcodes from SQEs (this _could_ be intercepted by seccomp, but is
> > > not currently written)
> > > - opcodes of the types of restrictions to restrict... for making sure
> > > things can't be changed after being set? seccomp already enforces
> > > that kind of "can only be made stricter"
> > In addition we want to limit the SQEs to use only the registered fd and buffers.
> Hmm, good point. Yeah, since it's an "extra" mapping (ioring file number
> vs fd number) this doesn't really map well to seccomp. (And frankly,
> there's some difficulty here mapping many of the ioring-syscalls to
> seccomp because it's happening "deeper" than the syscall layer (i.e.
> some of the arguments have already been resolved into kernel object
> pointers, etc).
> > Do you think it's better to have everything in seccomp instead of adding
> > the restrictions in io_uring (the patch isn't very big)?
> I'm still trying to understand how io_uring will be used, and it seems
> odd to me that it's effectively a seccomp bypass. (Though from what I
> can tell it is not an LSM bypass, which is good -- though I'm worried
> there might be some embedded assumptions in LSMs about creds vs current
> and LSMs may try to reason (or report) on actions with the kthread in
> mind, but afaict everything important is checked against creds.
> > With seccomp, would it be possible to have different restrictions for two
> > instances of io_uring in the same process?
> For me, this is the most compelling reason to have the restrictions NOT
> implemented via seccomp. Trying to make "which instance" choice in
> seccomp would be extremely clumsy.
> So at this point, I think it makes sense for the restriction series to
> carry on -- it is io_uring-specific and solves some problems that
> seccomp is not in good position to reason about.
Thanks for the feedback, then I'll continue in this direction!
> All this said, I'd still like a way to apply seccomp to io_uring
> because it's a rather giant syscall filter bypass mechanism, and gaining
> access (IIUC) is possible without actually calling any of the io_uring
> syscalls. Is that correct? A process would receive an fd (via SCM_RIGHTS,
> pidfd_getfd, or soon seccomp addfd), and then call mmap() on it to gain
> access to the SQ and CQ, and off it goes? (The only glitch I see is
> waking up the worker thread?)
It is true only if the io_uring istance is created with SQPOLL flag (not the
default behaviour and it requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN). In this case the
kthread is created and you can also set an higher idle time for it, so
also the waking up syscall can be avoided.
> What appears to be the worst bit about adding seccomp to io_uring is the
> almost complete disassociation of process hierarchy from syscall action.
> Only a cred is used for io_uring, and seccomp filters are associated with
> task structs. I'm not sure if there is a way to solve this disconnect
> without a major internal refactoring of seccomp to attach to creds and
> then make every filter attachment create a new cred... *head explody*
Sorry but I don't know seccomp that well :-(
I'm learning a lot about it these days. I'll keep your concern in mind.
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